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EDITORIAL
COVID-19 adaptive evolution during the pandemic – Implications of new SARS- 
CoV-2 variants on public health policies
The development and deployment of effective vac-
cines against SARS-CoV-2 infection have boosted 
public confidence and heralded a change in public 
health policies. The wearing of facemasks and social 
distancing has become increasingly relaxed in some 
countries, and large gatherings are again permitted. 
Here, we provide a biological argument against relax-
ing the COVID-19 restrictions during the exponen-
tial growth phase of infections whilst a significant 
proportion of the population remains unvaccinated 
(the so-called “British Experiment”). Using coevolu-
tionary and epidemiological theory, we explain the 
likely long-term consequences of this policy, and we 
argue for the benefits of “vaccination passports” and 
childhood vaccination.
Although vaccines have weakened the link between 
COVID-19 infection and mortality in some countries, 
using this as an argument to justify a broad change in 
policy for countries experiencing an exponential 
increase in infection numbers is flawed on two counts. 
First, most of the world’s population remains unvacci-
nated, and even in countries with efficient vaccination 
programmes, a significant proportion of the society 
remains unprotected. Children, the clinically extremely 
vulnerable, such as patients on immunosuppressants, 
and those who choose not to be vaccinated (or are 
unable to receive a vaccine) are all placed at an 
increased risk when relaxing COVID-19 restrictions. 
Initial analysis of UK wide data on the “Clinical 
Extremely Vulnerable” group of immunosuppressed 
transplant patients both shows the significant advan-
tages of vaccination in this group, and simultaneously 
demonstrates that the risk remains at a level substan-
tially above that of the general population [1, personal 
communication]. Consequently, without “vaccination 
passports” being enforced in crowded public places, 
vulnerable people are unable to manage their personal 
risks when traveling or socializing in a society with little 
or no COVID-19 restrictions.
Second, relaxing restrictions boosts transmission and 
allows the virus population to expand, which enhances 
its adaptive evolutionary potential and increases the 
risk of vaccine-resistant strains emerging through 
antigenic drift [2]. A fundamental theory of biology is 
that the rate of adaptive evolution is a function of the 
(additive) genetic variation present in a population or 
gene pool. This is known as Fisher’s fundamental the-
orem [3], and it implies that the adaptive evolutionary 
potential (present in an assortment of new variants) 
tends to increase with population size. In the case of 
a directly transmitted pathogen, such as SARS-CoV-2, 
this evolutionary potential scales positively with the 
number of infected hosts. Thus, by minimizing this 
number, we reduce not only the current COVID-19 
related mortality rate but also future COVID-19 related 
deaths by restricting the rate with which new SARS- 
CoV-2 variants arise.
As with any other host species, humans are engaged 
in a coevolutionary arms race with emerging infectious 
diseases, including SARS-CoV-2 [4]. However, unlike 
any natural arms race, humans fight this pandemic 
battle with an unusual type of armory; our scientific 
and medical advances, as well as our behavioral and 
societal changes. In the past 18 months, economies, 
education, and mental well-being have suffered tremen-
dously due to the restrictions imposed in an attempt to 
stem the spread of the pandemic. These restrictions 
have reduced mortality rates and bought us time to 
develop and employ effective vaccines. Nevertheless, 
the virus has continued to evolve increased transmissi-
bility, and even in some countries with the most 
advanced vaccination programs, the reproduction 
number Rt of the virus (i.e. the mean number of new 
infections arising from each infected individual at time 
t) is similar to the R0 of first wave of infection. Despite 
the success of vaccines and public health policies glob-
ally, the number of infected people continues to fluc-
tuate (Figure 1(a)), which is typical of coevolution. Like 
in so many other Red Queen arms races, there are no 
winners – coevolution is a zero-sum game [5]. 
Importantly, we need to realize that it is unlikely we 
will get ahead in this arms race unless we can signifi-
cantly reduce the population size of the virus. We 
therefore need to contain the adaptive evolutionary 
potential of this virus, and this can only be accom-
plished by a worldwide uptake of the vaccine. Until 
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that time, other social mitigation strategies will need to 
continue, despite the costs these entail.
Successive SARS-CoV-2 variants that have displaced one 
another since the outbreak (Figure 1(b)), have managed to 
do so based on relatively small sets of substitutions in their 
genetic code. More specifically, variants of concern such as 
B.1.1.7, B.1.351 and P.1 are characterized by the accumula-
tion of mutations in the spike glycoprotein (S), as well as in 
other genes [2]. Each successive dominant strain displaced its 
ancestral variant by the fact of having a higher transmissi-
bility [6]. This process is known as antigenic drift, and it has 
largely offset the gains we have made with vaccination 
Figure 1. (a) The global number of daily cases of COVID-19 fluctuates, similar as other co-evolutionary arms races. In spite of public 
health campaigns and vaccine rollout, the number is not declining consistent with coevolution of the virus (From https://www. 
worldometers.info/coronavirus/ 17 July 2021). (b) Histogram from COG-UK shows the variant sequences obtained in the UK since 
October 2020. The emergence of a new variant (delta variant) displaces its ancestral variant (alpha variant) – a pattern typical for Red 
Queens arms race in host-parasite co-evolution. From http://sars2.cvr.gla.ac.uk/cog-uk/ 17 July 2021 (c) Heatmap of COVID-19 
Cases in England between March 2020 to July 2021 broken down by age group. School age children remained largely unaffected in 
the first wave of the infection, but not the case in the second wave (alpha variant) and in the third wave (driven by the delta 
variant), high school age children and young adults are the most likely groups to be infected. From https://coronavirus.data.gov.uk/ 
details/cases?areaType=nation&areaName=England 17 July 2021.
2014 C. VAN OOSTERHOUT ET AL.
programs. Indeed, our battle with the virus it typical of the 
zero-sum game of “tit-for-tat” coevolution in a Red Queen’s 
arm race. Empirical evidence, modeling data, and experi-
ments on mouse-models furthermore suggest that increased 
transmissibility attributable to increased viremia may also 
lead to an increased virulence [7, 8, 9, 10], although this is not 
always the case [11]. Slowing down the rate of virus evolution 
requires us to act fast and decisively, reducing the number of 
infected people through the use of vaccines, in combination 
with other public health policies. On the human side, the 
arms race is fought with vaccines and behavioral change, but 
the principles are the same as genetic adaptations. Our 
recently acquired behavioral changes offer defense in the 
arms race against this pathogen, and those changes are 
adaptive and should be reinforced by public health policies. 
Relaxing these measures now would be letting our guard 
down in the middle of the battle, and it would place us at 
a significant disadvantage in the arms race with the virus.
Child vaccination
The observed shift in the ages most affected by subsequent 
variants of COVID-19 (Figure 1(c)) may be as a result of the 
adaptive evolution of SARS-CoV-2 to its human host. The 
fixation of subsequent variants of increased virulence, can be 
understood from the “virulence-transmission trade off” 
hypothesis [12,13]. This hypothesis states that pathogen 
replication poses an unavoidable cost to its host, i.e., the 
pathogen’s “virulence”. Unvaccinated children represent 
a large reservoir that is susceptible to infection but tolerant 
to the disease. Within this group, SARS-CoV-2 continues to 
evolve. As such, this unvaccinated part of the population puts 
more vulnerable groups at increased risk because of 1) ele-
vated transmission rates and 2) continued evolution of the 
virus. The low level of morbidity associated with COVID-19 
in most children argues against vaccinating this age group, as 
the vaccination of children could be considered unethical if it 
protects against a disease that carries only a small risk to 
a child’s health [14]. However, as soon as SARS-CoV-2 
variants evolve with significant virulence in this age group, 
child vaccination may be needed to control antigenic drift. 
Transmissibility, increased pathology, and viral titers are 
a linked triad, and hence, the evolution of new strains with 
higher transmissibility in children may also result in 
increased disease severity. In other words, this policy risks 
inadvertently selecting for variants that are better able to 
infect children, with higher titers and greater pathology in 
this previously largely refractory age group. Secondly, 
although vaccine driven virulence evolution remains only 
a theoretical possibility, the risks of a more virulent strain 
spreading into an under-vaccinated population could be 
more severe [15].
Conclusion
Entrusting public health measures to personal responsi-
bility, the laissez-faire approach that many governments 
are now taking toward COVID-19 management, risks 
substantially increasing mortality and morbidity in the 
wider population. During exponential transmission of 
virus, we argue for an ongoing, mandatory public health 
policy that includes social distancing and the compulsory 
wearing of facemasks in crowded indoor spaces such as 
shops and on public transport. Epidemiological evidence 
suggests that we can only safely start to relax these mea-
sures when the reproductive number (Rt) of the infection 
is below one. Our current vaccination programmes alone 
will not end the pandemic. Reaching long term accom-
modation with this virus requires immunity of nearly the 
whole world’s population either by vaccine or infection. 
Vaccines offer an affordable and highly effective mechan-
ism for delivering immunity without the substantial risks 
from infection which include acute illness and long 
COVID. The risk associated with large scale natural infec-
tion is not predictable because we cannot know the viru-
lence characteristics and vaccine susceptibility of the new 
variants that will continue to evolve. With an increasing 
number of people being infected, the rate of new variant 
evolution of SARS-CoV-2 accelerates, increasing the like-
lihood that SARS-CoV-2 variants will acquire higher 
virulence and vaccine escape potential. Such new variants 
could rapidly replace existing strains, particularly during 
the exponential growth phase of the infection. In the long- 
term, this would place increasing pressure on our societies 
and economies. To keep ahead in the battle against this 
virus, we need to take a long-term co-evolutionary per-
spective. We must not drop our guard in this arms race, as 
the virus continues to evolve, and we therefore must 
sustain global public health policies which are proven to 
reduce the transmission rate of this virus.
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